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To understand the conditions and experiences that might make an individual more 
vulnerable to terrorist radicalization, this study examines a sample group of Muslim’s in 
Great Britain to determine if  responses to survey questions on a range of issues and 
perceptions can provide indications of an individual’s vulnerability to terrorist 
radicalization.  Key to this process was the development of a vulnerability to 
radicalization score that allowed for an analysis of the relationship between this score and 
different independent variables. 
  The dataset for this study was obtained using the Pew Research Center’s Spring 
2006 Global Attitudes Project 15 Nation Survey.  This survey contains a significant 
oversampling of Muslim respondents allowing for the statistical analysis of potential 
vulnerability.  It is important to understand that this analysis does not provide any 
indication of radicalization, but a vulnerability based upon accepted theories discussed in 
terrorism literature.  The testing of commonly held theories regarding terrorist 
radicalization produced a very different picture from what has been viewed in the past. 
New findings include a previously unrecognized quantity of women who are potentially 
vulnerable to radicalization.  Additionally, income and education do not seem to play the 
pivotal role that is usually expected, and analysis indicates there is a link between the 
perceptions of actions by the United States government in the war to combat terrorism 
and the respondents’ vulnerability to radicalization. 
Recommendations are for the refinement and expansion of this study to include 
the remaining Western European democracies that were sampled and the United States in 
order to perform a comparative analysis proving a broader understanding regarding the 
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On July 29, 2007, two cars loaded with explosives were discovered in London.  
The next day two Islamic radicals drove a Jeep Cherokee into the terminal at Glasgow 
International Airport and attempted to explode the vehicle.  These same individuals were 
found to have been responsible for the failed car bombs discovered the previous evening.  
But, unlike the attacks of September 11, 2001, these bombers were not sent from 
Afghanistan with orders to commits these acts.  As it turns out, these men were trained 
physicians working in the United Kingdom.  Dr. Bilal Abdullah was 27 years old, born in 
the United Kingdom, while his companion Dr. Kafeel Ahmed was born in India.  Both 
men worked as doctors at the Royal Alexandra Hospital.  What caused these men, and 
other British citizens implicated in the attacks, to become radicalized and seek to commit 
these acts of terror?  Furthermore, why do we find young Muslim men: children and 
grandchildren of Muslim immigrants; born, raised, and schooled in a developed nation 
such as the United Kingdom joining the jihad and committing terrorist acts? 
It is unfortunate, but as Barbara Crenshaw (1983) points out when she quotes 
Irving Louis Horowitz, “terrorism has become a mode of doing politics” (Crenshaw 
1983, 143).  For groups like the Irish Republican Army, the German Red Army Faction, 
the Weathermen, the Aum Shinrikyo, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Tamil Tigers(to 
name only a few of the many groups), political violence escalating to acts of terrorism is 
the primary vehicle for attempting to affect political change.  Konrad Kellen (1998) 
provides as an example the radicals in West Germany in the 1960s, explaining that  
“when there was no substantial response to their political drives among either the elite or 
the masses, their ideology turned them into terrorists”(Kellen 1998, 47).  While terrorism 
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has not changed the nature of power, it has since September 11, 2001 changed the way 
many states address immigration, security and some social policies.  Therefore we must 
ask how have these policies changed, and have these changes had the effect of reducing 
or strengthening the available body of recruits for terrorist organizations?  An 
examination of a sample of the Muslim population in the United Kingdom provides us 
with an opportunity to make just such an evaluation.  With a purported rise in the 
radicalization and the advent of “homegrown” Islamist terrorists willing to commit 
suicide attacks of terror, such an analysis can be seen as an imperative. 
This research assumes that in order to combat homegrown Islamic terrorism it is 
necessary to understand what we mean by “radicalized.”  Radicalization can be defined 
as “the process of adopting or promoting an extremist belief system for the purpose of 
facilitating ideologically-based violence to advance political, religious, or social 
change.”1  It is commonly held that in certain countries like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and 
Syria, this radicalization process is a part of the enculturation and education of the 
population.  But is this the case?  An examination of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
shows this group did not begin to become radicalized until the government outlawed their 
organization and began to arrest and persecute its members.   
In Europe, the Muslim population has increased significantly as a result of 
immigration with an estimated 15-20 million Muslims now living in Europe,   
1.6-2 million in the United Kingdom alone (Leiken 2005).  With the real possibility of 
radicalization, these growing populations become a major concern, and each new attack 
brings calls for a crack down on Muslim extremists.  But do these types of focused 
                                                 
1 H.R. 1955 – To prevent homegrown terrorism, and for other purposes. April 19, 2007. 
United States House of Representatives. 
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government policies reduce the potential for violent political action, or is it possible that 
they actually serve to further radicalize the Muslim population?  Is it possible that 
government policy can serve as a catalyst for radicalization?  If so, what actions or 
policies can be identified that would cause someone who had previously been a law 
abiding moderate Muslim and lifelong citizen of the United Kingdom to become 
radicalized?   
 Within the broader study of terrorism there have been some attempts by 
academics to understand Islamic radicalization.  The majority of the scholarly work on 
radicalization has been centered on attempts to understand Islamic ideology and the 
Islamist agenda.  Further, considerable work has been done in an attempt to identify the 
structure of terrorist organizations and cells, recruitment practices, and phenomenon such 
as suicide attacks.  This paper will seek to build on this body of work indirectly by 
answering the recent call by many scholars to understand the roots of terrorism.   
In order to undertake this challenge it is first necessary to establish that becoming 
a terrorist is a process, with the first step in this process being radicalization.  With this 
starting point it is then possible to consider the factors, experiences, and perceptions that 
might make one vulnerable to terrorist radicalization.  Is it poverty?  Do perceptions 
regarding a lack of upward mobility or prosperity due to limited educational opportunities 
or being a recently arrived immigrant make one vulnerable?  Understanding the influence 
of these and other factors is essential if one is to consider the vulnerability of the Muslim 
population in Great Britain to terrorist radicalization. 
This analysis provides insights into this vulnerability and the influencing factors.  
Interestingly, the percentage of women found to be vulnerable to radicalization within 
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this sample is significantly higher than the almost uniformly male-centered profiles that 
have been constructed by many terrorism analysts and scholars previously.  It is also 
clear that the policies of the United States and its engagement in fighting terrorism and its 
involvement in the Middle East is a source of frustration among the Muslim population in 
Great Britain.  Additionally, several commonly held assumptions regarding education and 
income are shown to not have the influencing effect they were once considered to have. 
Lastly, the vulnerability of British born Muslims, as seen in the high percentage of 
naturally born citizens who are vulnerable to radicalization, seems to provide 
reinforcement to the concerns regarding the threat of homegrown terrorists within Great 
Britain. 




The difficulty in providing a literature review that discusses the concept of 
radicalization that leads to terrorism is the simple fact that very few studies have been 
focused on this earliest stage in the process of becoming a terrorist.  A considerable 
portion of the terrorist literature is concerned with the history of terrorism, an accounting 
of terrorist groups, and the acts they have committed, or the development of timelines to 
explain the growth of a particular terrorist group like al-Qaeda and the events that 
transpired leading up to and including the committing of terrorist acts.  What is missing 
from the literature on terrorism is substantive work that seeks to explain why young men 
and women become terrorists.  Just now, we are beginning to see in the literature calls for 
this type of analysis.  Scholars are recognizing that if we are to truly understand 
terrorism, we must begin to gather some understanding of the sources and the process of 
radicalization that leads individuals to join terrorist groups or cells (Sageman 2008, Silke 
2004).  Especially now, given the rise of the ‘homegrown’ terrorist in western 
democracies like the United Kingdom and Germany, the need for such knowledge is even 
more pressing. 
Over the years there have been many attempts to identify a terrorist profile in the 
hope of being able to more easily identify those individuals who are likely to join the 
ranks of the terrorist organizations.  These efforts have ranged from suggestions of 
psychological deficiencies to economic hardship.  While some of these theories have 
been found to be unrepresentative of the population being studies, it is important to 
consider that while there is no one phenomenon that can explain why someone commits 
terrorist acts, it may be possible to examine these various explanations as a collective of 
events that may lead one to become radicalized and involved in terrorist activities.  The 
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following represents a collection of some of the more popular theories that have been 
used to explain terrorism. 
Terrorist Psychopathy 
For years the popular notion among some social scientists was that it might be 
possible to create a terrorist profile.  One theory held that terrorists were psychologically 
unbalanced individuals who lashed out at the world.  Konrad Kellen (1982) discussed 
whether terrorists were “crazy.”  In his study, he cites Franco Ferracuti’s Psychiatric 
Aspect of Terrorism in Italy.  In this work, Kellen found that Ferracuti considered right 
wing terrorists to frequently be pathological while the left wing terrorists who adhered to 
an unrealistic ideology were more normal yet still fanatical (Kellen 1982; Laqueur 1987)   
Jerrold Post (1998) argues that terrorists act out of a sort of psycho-logic whereby 
their joining, participation, and committing of terrorist acts is a result of psychological 
abnormalities (see also Sageman 2004).  Post (2007) goes further, however, to posit that 
individuals become terrorists because they have suffered some sort of injustice as a child, 
are rebelling against authority due to having an authoritative father, or have been raised 
up in a family that adheres to a terrorist ideology.  In his latest work, The Mind of the 
Terrorist, Post is careful to avoid openly stating that terrorists suffer from some sort of 
psychopathy, but goes on to offer a laundry list of potential psychological explanations of 
why someone becomes a terrorist.  His recounting of individual terrorist story’s provide 
some childhood experience that he feels drove them to join a terrorist organization.  Post 
(2007) does not, however, cover the time when this individual made the decision to 
become a terrorist.  He jumps from what he perceived to be the psychological ‘root’ of 
the problem and does not consider the process by which this individual became 
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radicalized and then incorporated into a terrorist organization.  Post continues to see the 
terrorist as a damaged individual who is acting out in response to some prior 
psychological trauma or individual psychopathy.  
However, Barbara Crenshaw (2000), finds this tendency to see terrorists “as 
motivated by personality disorders such as narcissism or paranoia,” to be seeking to 
diagnose from a distance and only serves to, “taint terrorism with a pathology aura” 
(Crenshaw 2000, 407; see also Horgan 2005).  Marc Sageman (2004) adds, in his study 
of known terrorists (172 subjects) and terrorist groups, he did not detect “a pattern of 
paranoid personality or lifestyle before joining jihad” (Sageman 2004, 83).  Those who 
reject this psychological explanation suggest becoming a terrorist is a process.  It should 
be considered that while no one theory can explain why someone becomes a terrorist, it 
may be possible to provide a checklist of possibilities that when combined may serve to 
promote radicalization. 
 
Frustration Aggression Theory 
In examining the frustration aggression paradigm, it is clear that there are 
possibilities of this theory providing some insight into why and how someone could 
become radicalized.  Ted Gurr (1970) points out that when individuals become frustrated 
due to conditions they perceive as being unjust or unfair, and they further perceive that all 
legitimate avenues for redress have been expired or are closed, then the frustration that 
has built up over time results in these individuals becoming radicalized and eventually, a 
small portion of the population that is radicalized actually chooses to commit terrorist 
acts.  Gurr (1970) suggests that the concept of “relative deprivation” explains the 
perception of the way things out to be as compared to the way they are (Gurr 1970, 23).  
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This perception may not be a true representation of the actual conditions but as a 
collective value it can drive individuals to commit violence.  According to Gurr, “The 
frustration aggression relationship provides the psychological dynamic for the proposed 
relationship between intensity of deprivation and the potential for collective violence 
(Gurr 1970, 23).  In a later work he suggests that, “impatience and frustration provide an 
expressive motivation and rationalistic grounds that make it likely that some activists will 
decide to experiment with terror tactics “ (Gurr 1990, 87). 
 While the frustration aggression concept is central to explaining why people may 
begin down the path to radicalization leading to terrorism it does not provide the 
overarching answer to this question.  Many Muslims are unhappy with the conditions of 
their lives but few decide to become terrorists.  It is important to determine if there are 
any specific phenomena that may serve to frustrate the target population, and if so, what 
the significance of this frustration is to the process of radicalization.  Sources of 
frustration, especially among the Muslim communities in Western Europe could include 
perceived economic and political deprivation; lack of social identity; and perceived 
oppression as a result of government policy. 
 
Economic deprivation/Poverty Theory  
 While many have, in the past, considered poverty and poor education to be the 
driving force behind radicalization and recruitment into terrorist organizations, this model 
has been found to be less representative than first thought and in some cases 
unrepresentative.  Alan Krueger (2007) points out that “a wealth of evidence now shows 
that any effect of education and poverty on terrorism is indirect, complicated, and 
probably quite weak” (Krueger 2007, 13).  Further he suggests civil liberties are a more 
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important determinant of terrorism, and there may be some indirect link between 
economic conditions and civil liberties.  In an earlier work, he suggested radicalization 
and terrorism should be viewed as a “response to political conditions and long-standing 
feelings of indignity and frustration that have little to do with economics” (Krueger & 
Maleckova 2003, 119).  This notion is supported by Mark Thomson and Maurice Crul 
(2007) and by Robbert Woltering (2002) in their finding that children of immigrants are 
better educated and are able to find more skilled employment than their parents.  Further, 
Erich Weede (1987) suggests that even in developing countries, inequality and economic 
development do not lead to violence; with regime repression having only a weak 
relationship.  While it is accepted second and third generation Muslim immigrants are 
better educated and have better economic opportunities than their parents and/or 
grandparents, it seems there still exists a perception of inequity and discrimination 
fueling discontent.  This condition, coupled with the demonization of immigrants 
following 9/11, makes this population susceptible to radicalization. 
Efforts to integrate these immigrants have been both late and inadequate.  
According to Hansen, “Migrants and their descendants are poorly represented in national 
parliaments; they suffer disproportionately high levels of unemployment; and they thus 
draw disproportionately on welfare services” (Hansen 2003, 33).  In 1998 employment 
figures for the United Kingdom showed 75.1% of whites were employed and 57% of the 
black and Asian populations were employed.  This contrasts sharply with employment 
rates of 35% for Pakistanis and 41% for Bangladeshi immigrants.  In Germany, the 
employment figures are equally appalling.  Unemployment rates among immigrants were 
nearly twice the national average of 8.8% with fully 16.4% unemployment.   
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Aside from employment inequities, income disparities also plague the Muslim immigrant 
community.   
 Income inequality can be considered another source of frustration among the 
immigrant Muslim population.  While educational opportunities are equal for nearly all 
British citizens, employment practices and the opportunity to make equal wages 
continues to be a problem.  Unemployment and underemployment can be seen as further 
contributing factors to explain immigrant radicalization.   
 Table 1 illustrates clearly the income inequalities that exist between Muslim and 
non-Muslims.  As we can see, while few Muslims exist at the higher income brackets, 
Muslims are represented significantly and disproportionately in the income level that is 
seen as below the poverty line for each country.   
 
Table 1: Income 
Country   Muslims        General Public      Difference    
France: Euros 
29,500 or more 
7,500-29,499 













Spain:  Euros 
21,500 or more 
14,500-21,499 













  Germany: Euros 
30,000 or more 
18,000-29,999 













Great Britain: B.P. 
40,000 or more 
20,000-39,999 













Pew Research Center May 2007 
 While it can be argued that poverty is not the cause of terrorism, it must be 
considered that income inequality, or at least the strong perception of inequality, could 
serve as a catalyst to radicalization.   
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Terrorism as political violence 
 Ehud Sprizak (1998) considers terrorism to be a political phenomenon resulting 
from “a prolonged process of delegitimization of the established society or regime…a 
process whose beginning is, almost always nonviolent and non-terroristic” (Sprizak 1998, 
78).  Ted Gurr (1998) sees radicalization as the road to terrorism and explains it as “a 
process in which the group has been mobilized in pursuit of a social or political objective 
but has failed to make enough progress toward the objective to satisfy all activists” (Gurr 
1998, 87).  Participants at an Oslo conference June 2003 listed several ‘root causes’ 
routinely associated with terrorism.  Among them are a lack of democracy, eroded civil 
liberties, and a breakdown in the rule of law, extreme ideologies, the experience of 
discrimination on the basis of ethnic or religious origins, and the experience of social 
injustice, to name but a few (Horgan 2005).   
 
The Process Model 
John Horgan (2005) suggests that becoming a terrorist is a process that starts with 
becoming radicalized, moves to actively engaging in terrorist activities, and in the final 
stage of disengagement moving away from the terrorist group or activities.  He feels that 
the discussion of terrorism as a process is essential to moving the discussion away from 
attempts to define terrorism or analyze the phenomenon through a series of events.  What 
is important to the process model is explaining, “behaviours and their antecedents, 
expected consequences, and outcomes that are associated with terrorism” (Horgan 2005, 
80).  While focusing on the questions of ‘how’ people move through the process, Horgan 
does not ignore the burning question of ‘why’ individuals decide to engage in terrorist 
activities.  Offering examples of the IRA ‘terrorist’ who began by marching in 
11 
 
Republican marches, became an activist, and was eventually charged with. “several 
attempted murders, attempted kidnapping, arms possession, as well as membership in an 
illegal organization,” this individual did not consider himself a terrorist but rather a 
participant in the ongoing process of politicization in Northern Ireland (Horgan 2005, 
85).  Interestingly, this individual was raised in a non-political home.  His exposure and 
witness to police brutality of the nationalist was central to his development of sentiments 
toward the nationalist cause and his joining of the Republican movement. 
Horgan discusses catalysts as primary factors in the individual’s decision to become 
involved in terrorism.  These catalysts can include the witnessing of racially, ethnically, 
or religiously based abuses by majority groups, police, military, or government: the 
murder, torture, or victimization of a friend or family member; the persecution of a group 
or community the individual identifies with, particularly when there are fundamentalist 
groups involved; or the individuals response to government policies that are perceived as 
threatening the individual or the groups they associate themselves with.  It is important to 
note that this association can extend to populations in other counties.   It is well known 
that new recruits into al-Qaeda cells and other groups associated with the global Salafi 
movement in Europe were developed by creating a psychological link between them and 
Muslims in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan.  They were compelled to join their 
‘Muslim brothers’ in combat and travelled to fight alongside them, thus receiving vital 
terrorist training. 
Another attractant to terrorism can be the individual’s desire to be part of a group 
as a result of his/her identification with the group’s leader, the stated religious or political 
ideology of the group, or the desire to gain social status within the community by joining 
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the group.  Lastly, Horgan suggests that timing is critical to the process of joining a 
terrorist group.  It is well known that individuals who are recruited into terrorist 
organizations are typically vetted in order to ensure internal security.  New members are 
given low level tasks to perform while their trustworthiness is evaluated by the leaders of 
the cell or group.  It is interesting to note that there are cases where European Muslims 
who went to train with al-Qaeda returned prior to completing their training finding the 
conditions and the ideology too extreme for their liking.  In these cases, the cold reality of 
terrorist training did not match with the ‘romantic’ idea of being a terrorist.  Consider the 
harm such individuals could do to a terrorist cell or larger organization if they had been 
handed the entire ‘playbook’ upon initial interest or after first arriving at the training 
camp.    
Using Horgan’s concept of the process model it is interesting when one considers 
the possibility of identifying individuals who might be vulnerable to terrorist 
radicalization based upon their individual experiences and sentiments as a result of those 
experiences. Other factors include perceptions of political efficacy, social status, cultural 
security, and perceptions of equality, opportunity, coupled with sentiments of cultural or 
religious persecution.  This begs the question, can the radicalization of some Muslim 
immigrants in Great Britain be considered a result of the ‘root causes’ of terrorism or are 
these radicalizing factors more individualistic in nature and rooted in the individual’s 




Government policy as a catalyst 
Policy can serve as a potential catalyst to radicalization.  Terrorist writings from 
the nineteenth-century confirm provocation of the government was seen as strategic in 
order to provoke repressive actions that could be used to rally support for the terrorist 
cause (Crenshaw 1998).  Gregory Miller (2007) agrees that harsh government policies 
can result in ‘cycles of violence.’  Further, he suggests inaction can be just as detrimental, 
allowing violent factions to take hold within a country, much as we have seen in the 
United Kingdom.  With radicalism on the rise, and terror attacks on the home front, such 
permissiveness is viewed as excessive and dangerous (Leiken 2005).  New policies 
regarding immigration and security are being implemented to address these concerns.  
However, Paul Wilkinson (2007) warns such measures must be rooted in the rule of law 
and seek to uphold human rights to, “insure these values and the institutional safeguards 
that ensure their continued observance are not sacrificed on the grounds of ‘protecting 
national security’” (Wilkinson 2007, 9). 
 
Immigration policy 
Immigration policy within the United Kingdom has changed significantly as a 
result of terrorist concerns.  Post World War II immigration policy was primarily 
concerned with the rebuilding and economic expansion of the United Kingdom.  Such a 
policy, designed to meet short-term economic interests, did little to ensure the long-term 
economic viability of the immigrant population or the upward mobilization of second and 
third generation immigrants (Hansen 2003).  The result of this policy has been the 
alienation of the children and grandchildren of Muslim immigrants, “born and bred under 
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European liberalism,” now underemployed and made to feel unwelcome (Leiken 2005, 
4).   
Even before 9/11, economic downturns in the U.K. created an anti-immigrant 
sentiment among non-immigrants.  Opposition to immigration and new support for anti-
immigration parties and policies increased as levels of unemployment rose (Sides and 
Citrin 2007).  Applications for those seeking asylum saw a decrease in acceptance from 
85.9% in 1990 to 23.8% in 1997 (Rudolph 2003).  New policies regarding immigration 
have become very restrictive, especially for Muslims.  Since September 11, 2001, the 
migrant-as-a-threat paradigm has shaped new immigration policy (Ibrahim 2005).  The 
prominent philosophy is the enemy outside will be kept out through strict immigration 
control and the enemy within will be hunted down by security forces.  By identifying the 
foreigner as the threat, Elspeth Guild (2003) suggests such action can serve to justify the 
expulsion of foreign nationals as well.  Such a move is supportive of Christopher 
Rudolph (2003) and his 9/11 hypothesis where he states, “newly established links 
between migration and military threat will swing grand strategy sharply toward closure” 
(Rudolph 2003, 606). As immigrants become viewed as a security threat as a result of 
ongoing terrorist operations, it can be expected that future opportunities for immigration 
will be closed and efforts will be undertaken to deport any current immigrants who are 
suspected of terrorist involvement.  One manifestation of past immigration policy is the 
isolation of the Muslim immigrant community within the United Kingdom (Leiken 





Policies focused on multiculturalism are viewed as having created conditions 
which separated the Muslim immigrant community, resulting in racism, discrimination, 
and a general sense of being disadvantaged, generating feelings of hostility (Abbas 2005).  
Tahir Abbas (2005) points out that a vast majority of Muslims, “are often trapped in low 
income employment, suffer heavy ethnic penalties through underemployment, live in 
some of the poorest housing with poor amenities, and tend to suffer high rates of illness.”  
(Abbas 2005, 163).  The model of assimilation in the United States following the 
Japanese and Chinese immigration cycle in the 1920s-30s found immigrants developing 
local economies, with second and third generation immigrants becoming fully assimilated 
and functioning as a part of the larger population.  Such assimilation served to diminish 
cultural differences and facilitated the mobilization of the children and grandchildren of 
these immigrants during the post war era (Alba&Nee 1997).  This is not the picture found 
within the Muslim immigrant community in the United Kingdom.  A shared sense of lack 
of belonging and exclusion from mainstream politics, creates a condition of “disaffection, 
disenfranchisement and isolation” that function to lead both “poorer and richer Muslims” 
to radicalization (Abbas 2007). 
 While the British government accepts the realities of immigration, there are now 
calls to “reclaim British-ness” (Melotti 2006, 206).  New laws on immigration, asylum 
seekers, and citizenship have limited the flow of newcomers.  Additionally, new laws 
now require biometric identification of immigrants, with naturalization and long-term 
stays more difficult, and a requirement that new foreigners settling in the United 
Kingdom learn English, in addition to other measures targeted at facilitating integration 
(Melotti 2006).  The need to create this sense of British-ness is viewed as necessary given 
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the realization that fully 81% of the Muslim immigrant population views themselves as 
Muslim first and British second.   
This disconnection and ostracization from European society has produced some 
strong sentiment among the immigrant population across a wide range of issues.  The 
Pew Research Group conducted a survey through the Pew Global Attitudes Project to 
measure Muslim attitudes in Europe, and the findings are very enlightening and sobering.  
As a measure of identification, when asked, “What do you consider yourself first?”  81% 
of the Muslims in Great Britain answered that they considered themselves Muslim first 
and British second.  In Spain the number was 69% Muslim first, Germany was 66% and 
France followed at 46%.2 
Given the history regarding the treatment of and policies toward the Muslim 
immigrant population in Europe, and terrorist attacks that have taken place in the last few 
years, it comes as no surprise that Europeans are concerned about Islamic extremism.  
When polled about how worried they actually were about Islamist extremism, 78% of 
Germans responded that they were very/somewhat concerned, as did 77% of those from 
Spain, 75% from the Netherlands, 73% from France, and 70% from the United 
Kingdom.3  Further immigration is also a concern shared by non-Muslims in Europe.  
When asked about immigration concerns associated with opposition to Turkey’s 
inclusion into the European Union 81% of the French saw it as a bad thing.  Likewise 
                                                 
2 Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural Identity, The Pew 
Global Attitudes Project. July, 2006. P.3. 
3 Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics, The Pew Global Attitudes 
Project. July, 2005. P. 18. 
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76% of the Germans, 67% of those from the Netherlands, and 44% of Great Britain’s 
expressed concern regarding further immigration resulting from EU acceptance.4 
 
Marginalization 
 The marginalization of the Muslim immigrant community via multiculturalism is 
seen in how the British government dealt with discrimination.  By promoting 
multiculturalism among the immigrant populations, the unintended effect was the 
isolation of those populations, preventing them from fully assimilating into British 
society.  While discrimination was historically seen as a black-white issue, with most 
Muslims considering themselves to be white, the laws did not address discrimination on 
the basis of religion.  Muslims were considered to be solely a religious group and direct 
discrimination was lawful under the 1976 Race Relations Act; a condition that was not 
changed until 2003 (Modood & Ahmad 2007).  The issue of discrimination has been 
highlighted recently by the controversy surrounding the niqab (veil) and the comments of 
Member of Parliament (MP) Jack Straw regarding the cultural separation created when a 
Muslim woman wears a veil.  Isaac Kfir (2007) points out that the government response 
to these and other issues fails to assuage the angst of the Muslim street because they do 
not talk to the young people.  As a result, “young British Muslims increasingly take the 
position that civil protest is insufficient and that only through the use of violence would a 
change be made” (Kfir 2007, 102).  A prime example of this condition is the story of 
Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikkh, a British born Muslim of Pakistani origin who, having 
gone to the private Forest School and studied at the London School of Economics, chose 




to join the jihad and has now been sentenced to death for his involvement in the kidnap 
and murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl (Kfir 2007). 
Security policy 
While studies showing links between immigration and criminal activity are 
greatly exaggerated, Margaret Thatcher’s statement that “we joined Europe to have free 
movement of goods, not to have free movement of terrorists, criminals, drugs, and illegal 
immigrants” only serves to perpetuate the “criminological axis” as it relates to Muslim 
immigrants (Karyotis 2007, 9).  Internal security has become a key issue in the United 
Kingdom.  Since September 11, 2001, British Muslims report being disproportionately 
targeted for “stop and searches.”  From 2002-2003, these stop and searches rose among 
the Asian community by 285%, and 2003-2004 increases were another 40% raising the 
number of stop and searches to almost 30,000 (Poynting & Mason 2006).   
Anti-Terrorism legislation, rushed through in the wake of 9/11, resulted in the banning of 
sixteen Islamic organizations and the arrest of over 1000 Muslims with only twenty 
convictions by 2006 (Poynting & Mason 2006; Abbas 2007).  This situation is 
exacerbated by comments like those of MP Hazel Blears, the minister responsible for 
counter terrorism, who said in 2005, “Muslims will have to accept the reality that they 
will be stopped and searched more often than the rest of the public” (Abbas 2007, 294).  
Therefore, British Muslims argue much of the responsibility for the rise in radicalization 
“lies squarely with the host society” (Szrbis, Baldassar, & Poynting 2007, 266).
 Isolation, disenfranchisement, and the restriction of civil liberties seem to make 
quite a case for radicalization and violent action.  In his analysis of the social dynamics of 
terrorism, Austin Turk (1982) suggests political violence, “may be the product of a 
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scarcely articulated resentment of felt obstructions and sensed antagonists, or of a highly 
developed consciousness and analysis of political relationships” (Turk 1982, 121).  
Another victim in the wake of Islamic terrorist attacks in Europe will most likely be the 
multiculturalism that has existed in the United Kingdom.  With the Muslim birth rate in 
Europe being triple that of non-Muslims, it is expected the Muslim population will 
double by 2015 (Taspinar 2003).  This realization, coupled with the reality that the 
Muslim street in Europe is “on its way to having more political weight than the Arab 
street of Egypt or Saudi Arabia,” has brought further calls for assimilation and an end to 
multiculturalism (Taspinar 2003, 77).  Calls for assimilation are more easily understood 
when one considers it is difficult to differentiate between Muslims who harbor anti-
western views but are non-violent, and those who are willing and ready to resort to 
violence.  “This distinction can be frustrating for the political establishment, as evidenced 
by the Muslim community’s reaction to the 7 July bombings in the United Kingdom, 
where the leaders of the Muslim community condemned the atrocity but seemed to 
insinuate that they understood the anger of the terrorists” (Azzam 2007, 123).   
 Maha Azzam (2007) points out that “radicalization does not emerge in a vacuum” 
(Azzam 2007, 124).  With this understanding, and the understanding of the literature 
relating to policies past and present that affect Muslims, it is possible to see how some 
within the Muslim community can become radicalized and seek to participate in violent 
terrorist activity.  However, while it is easy to blame the policies of the host government, 
it must be stated that without the rhetoric of the Islamist Imams, and foreign recruiters 
sent by the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda, seeking to recruit these disaffected youth 
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into their jihad, this radicalization might follow a more conventional path of political 
protest and street violence rather than terrorism.     
 
Demographics 
In order to fully examine the roots of radicalization, we must also consider what 
the demographic of the ‘typical’ Islamist terrorist is in the United Kingdom.  Age is one 
variable that must be considered when seeking to find a target population for study.  
Sageman’s sample of 172 terrorists found the average age for joining the jihad was 25.69 
years of age (Sageman 2004).  However, in his more recent work, examining the 
‘homegrown’ phenomenon, Sageman (2008) finds that younger individuals, many in their 
early teens, are seeking to join the terrorist movement.  However, no work has been done 
to establish an updated estimate regarding age beyond the 25 average.  One reason for the 
high percentage of young terrorists is the practice of engaging university students in 
Islamist discussion groups which are seeking to locate viable targets for recruitment.  
This same process can be seen in the Red Army Faction (RAF) terrorist group in West 
Germany.  In his examination of the RAF, Klaus Wasmund (1986) found the terrorist 
group rose out of the organized student movements of the 1960s and 70s.  His view was 
terrorists were “victims of group thinking,” and his focus on group dynamics serves as a 
point of enlightenment when considering the radicalization process (Wasmund 1986, 





Many scholars agree that the radicalization within the Muslim community is 
strongly influenced by group dynamics and their interaction in Islamic study groups and 
other prayer groups (Smelser2007; Sageman 2004; Krueger 2007; Kfir 2007; Crenshaw 
1989).  Many of these group meetings are not only held on University campuses, but are 
often funded by the University in response to demands from the student movement 
leaders (Islamist recruiters) and threats of discrimination.  The dispossessed/radicalized 
college student is one representative group targeted for recruitment.  The other target 
group is made up of troubled youths who are estranged from their families and searching 
for a sense of belonging (Roy 2005).  These youths, also in small groups, find themselves 
easy targets for radicalization and recruitment into terrorist activity much the same way 
youths are recruited into street gangs in the United States.  The individuals are brought 
into the mosque and form Islamist study groups which become their surrogate families.  
From here it is a simple process of radicalization via Islamist ideology and recruitment 
into the jihad (Smelser 2007).  There is, however, a common theme between both groups; 
dispossession.  Dispossession, according to Neil Smelser (2007), “is the perception on the 
part of the group that it is systematically excluded, discriminated against, or 
disadvantaged with respect to some meaningful aspect of social, economic, and political 
life to which it feels entitled” (Smelser 2007, 16).   
The evolution of the group can be considered central to the radicalization process, 
particularly among the immigrant Muslim population.  Terrorism scholars point to the 
importance of the group or the “bunch of guys” to the growth of, or recruitment into 
terrorist cells (Crenshaw 1981; Sageman 2008; Vidino 2006).  The evolution along the 
path to radicalization that leads to the formation of the small group may be considered the 
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turning point of the radicalization continuum.  Once within the group, the radicalization 
process seems to speed up as the members of the group begin to isolate themselves from 
the general population, and serve as the self-motivating force behind the group’s 
collective identity and radicalization efforts.   
Considerable work within social science has been done to examine how “closed” 
groups can gain a sense of identity that leads to an us-vs-them mentality.  The 1954 
Robbers Cave Experiment, conducted by Muzafer Sherif proved an excellent example of 
how quickly small groups can form identities and become adversarial to those that exist 
outside the group.  Twenty boys were chosen and split into two groups (the Eagles and 
the Rattlers) and placing them in an isolated location for three weeks.  By the end of the 
experiment the Eagles and the Rattlers had, “entered into conflict” (Fine, 2004).  Most 
interesting are the conclusions Sherif (1954) and his group make regarding the reaction to 
shared frustrations.  In the conclusion he considerers the approaches used to explain inter-
group behavior and states: 
One of these approaches advances frustration suffered in the life history of the 
individual as the main causal factor and constructs a whole explanatory edifice 
for inter-group aggression on this basis.  Certainly aggression is one of the 
possible consequences of frustration experienced by the individual.  But, in order 
that individual frustration may appreciably affect the course of inter-group trends 
and be conducive to standardization of negative attitudes toward an out-group, 
the frustration has to be shared by other group members and perceived as an 




This same phenomenon can be seen as immigrant Muslim men, brought together 
by shared frustrations and a growing interest in radical ideology form study or prayer 
groups, developing into a cohesive unit that begins to meet daily isolating themselves 
from family and friends by moving into an apartment or home, quitting school or jobs, 
and spending all their time reading jihadist literature and watching jihadist video’s.  
Crenshaw (1998) suggests that the group members begin to engage in ‘one-upmanship’ to 
see who can be the most devout or the better jihadist leading potentially to involvement 
in terrorist activities. 
Recruitment of Muslim youths 
 There are three primary groups from which the Islamists seek to recruit troubled 
youths who are estranged from their families, disaffected college students and young 
professionals, and inmates within the prison system.  Troubled youths are the most 
vulnerable to radicalization, much like young delinquents recruited into street gangs; they 
are usually relegated to performing support functions for the group (stealing materials, 
money, and so on.)  These young Muslims have usually been in legal trouble, are often 
users of alcohol or drugs, have had significant difficulties with their parents, and may be 
estranged from their homes.  In cases where these individuals become radicalized, it 
usually occurs when a small group of friends brings them to a mosque for shelter.  Once 
inside the mosque, he becomes a part of a prayer group of other disaffected youths, who 
then become his surrogate family.  In this environment, the young Muslim is then ripe for 
recruitment by a radical Mosque member who might lead a prayer group, or an Islamist 
imam whose message is anti-western and promotes the Islamist agenda (Smelser 2007, 
98).  Smelser admits that this relationship is complicated, but states that the mosque and 
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its leaders, “helped provide the religiously based ideological frame for the groups, thus 
assuming a supplementary rather than a simply indoctrinating role.  By virtue of this 
pattern, religious ideology and group affiliation serve to supplement and reinforce one 
another and work toward the kind of commitment that would propel young men into lives 
of righteous battle, exposure to danger, and sometimes suicide” (Smelser 2007, 98).   
 One example of this dynamic is Salman Abdulla, a seventeen-year-old high 
school drop out, who had been involved in street violence:   
“Two older boys from the gym he used in Bradford told Abdullah about a 
preacher from Finsbury Park, and took him along when they went to hear Abu 
Hamza, who was appearing at a community hall near their home.  The cleric 
spoke about the frustration of Abdullah’s generation, who felt no genuine 
affiliation to Britain, the country of their birth, nor to their ancestral land, 
Pakistan, which they had never visited.  He spoke quickly, his voice rising as he 
offered his audience an alternative allegiance-Islam” (O’Neil & McGrory 2006, 
77). 
Abdullah was recruited to fight in the jihad, send to Kashmir for training and combat, and 
returned to Finsbury Park ‘a hero’ in the eyes of his fellow Islamists in London.   
 
College recruitment 
Recruitment of middle and upper class second and third generation immigrant 
Muslims is done in a very different way.  Student groups on University campuses funded 
by Islamist organizations like al-Muhajiroun (Kfir 2007, 105), Hizb ut-Tahrir (Baran 
2005, 7), Jamat-e-Islami (Husain 2007, 72), and the Muslim Brotherhood reach out to 
young Muslim students just as many student groups seek membership on many American 
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college campuses (Taarnby 2005, 43) and these student groups that go by names like the 
Muslim Unity Organization and the Young Muslim Organization.  Radical student group 
leaders begin by seeking privileges, from the university, on behalf of their Muslim 
members.  These usually begin with requests for a designated hall for daily prayers and 
escalate to concessions regarding Muslim dress, customs, and even demands for a hallal 
menu for food that meets Islamic standards.  
Meetings can include fiery Islamist rhetoric and the showing of films from 
conflict areas like Bosnia and Afghanistan, depicting ‘atrocities against their Muslim 
brothers’.  The most radical groups will conclude these types of meetings with calls for 
volunteers to go and fight in the jihad.  Students answering this call are sent to training 
camps where their indoctrination and terrorist training begins in earnest.  While some of 
these new recruits leave these training camps early, and do not participate in any fighting 
or future terrorist attacks, the ones that stay are fully fledged jihadists, and represent a 
significant danger upon return to their home country.   




The Purpose of this Analysis 
The purpose of this analysis is multifaceted.  First, it was important to determine whether 
it was possible to develop an indicator or measure of the individual’s potential for 
radicalization.  Then, using this measure, we asked whether other variables could be used 
to ‘explain’ the vulnerability to radicalization among the Muslim population that was 
surveyed.  While this is in no way an attempt to develop a ‘terrorist profile’ it does offer 
the unique opportunity to gain insight into the individual experiences and perceptions that 
may lead one to become vulnerable to terrorist radicalization and recruitment.  It is 
important to note that while an individual may be highly vulnerable to radicalization, this 
does not in any way guarantee that he or she will join a terrorist group or commit 
terrorist acts.  They may never engage in these activities, may find legal ways to seek 
redress, or may offer financial support to causes or groups they are sympathetic to 
without being directly involved in any terrorist acts (although financial and logistical 
assistance is now, in many cases, considered a terrorist act). 
 
Data Source 
As previously stated, the group to be studied is Muslims within Great Britain.  The Pew 
Research Center’s Spring 2006 Global Attitudes Survey of 15 Nations, provides a Great 
Britain sample size of N=902 with a substantial over-sample of Muslims with N=412.  
Answers to questions from this survey provide the necessary data to measure the 
individual’s vulnerability to radicalization as the dependent variable, and provide 
substantive responses to questions that allow for the measurement of individual data and 
attitudes regarding public policies and personal experiences/perceptions of concern.  
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Prior to analysis, the subset of British Muslims was isolated from the entire 15 nation 
dataset as were the questions that received responses from the subject group. 
 
 
Radicalization as the Dependent Variable 
To measure the dependent variable it was necessary to develop a ‘radicalization’ 
scale.  Such scaling was needed in order to measure the independent variables against a 
range of dependent variables without complex multivariate analysis.  Louis Guttman 
(1944) suggests it is possible to create a scale from a universe of qualitative data.  By 
choosing a group of variables that would represent conditions of the phenomenon to be 
measured and applying a quantitative measure to the qualitative answers, a scale can be 
obtained.  Such a measure has two advantages. “First, a mnemonic advantage, for a 
compact representation would be easier to remember than a large table; and second, if it 
were desired to relate the universe to other variables it would be easier to do so by means 
of a compact representation than by using the large multivariate distribution of the 
attributes in the universe (Guttman 1944, 142).  The theory is that as an individual ranks 
higher on the scale, they would also rank higher in the universe of independent variables 
(Guttman 1944).   
However, Guttman (1944) warns that while a group of variables may be scalable 
for one population, they may not for another population.  For this reason, certain 
variables will be excluded from the scale.  For instance, citizenship, which could be seen 
as a very important issue in the United Kingdom among second and third generation 
immigrants, would be irrelevant in France where children of immigrants are 
automatically considered citizens. While this scale was being created to measure the 
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vulnerability to radicalization in the United Kingdom, care was taken when choosing 
scalable variables so that future studies in the region may utilize the same process.  
Therefore, citizenship will be among the universe of independent variables. 
It is necessary to clarify that this scale or score is not an indicator of the individual’s 
involvement in terrorist activity.  It is a representation, based on the analysis provided 
herein, of what can be considered the individuals susceptibility to radicalization as it 
relates to the cumulative scoring of the responses to ten questions that make up the 
‘radicalization set’ and the segregation of these scored into high, moderate, and low 
vulnerability to radicalization.  These ten variables were chosen because they allow for 
the measurement of certain ‘known’ conditions that exist within the terrorist/radicalized 
community as described in the terrorist literature. 
Variables used to develop this scale reflect the individual’s national identity, 
degree of social satisfaction, identification with terrorist ideology or actions, the 
measurement of alienation or disenfranchisement felt by the respondent, the willingness 
to develop alternate realities, the displacement of blame for hardships/conditions on 
external entities, perceptions that the individuals way of life/cultural identity is at risk, 
views regarding violence as a means of political protest, and views regarding the 
acceptability of suicide bombing.   
Self identification 
 How an individual perceived his/her identity as it relates to the nation is 
important.  The question from the survey establishing the individual’s self-identification 
as British or Muslim first provides for an understanding of this perception.  The 
importance of this measure is seen in Melotti’s (2006) discussion of the need for creating 
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a sense of “British-ness” given the knowledge that 81% of the Muslims in the U.K. see 
themselves as Muslims first and British second.  It is important to understand if this same 
attitude pervades the Muslim sample in the Pew survey.  While the survey indicates that 
there is a self identification of Muslim first in 81% of the Muslim respondents, it is 
crucial to determine whether this identification is of a moderate or of a more 
fundamentalist nature.   
 The individual’s identification with terrorist groups, agendas, or actions may 
provide a valuable indication of their openness to radical ideologies.  These sentiments 
may also reflect the person’s agreement or disagreement with their own country’s foreign 
policy decisions regarding groups like Hamas or al-Qaeda.  The individual’s 
identification with these groups is viewed by Crenshaw (2000) as being an essential part 
of the process of becoming a terrorist.  This is seen as the beginning of the us-vs-them  
paradigm of radicalization.  Within the survey, when questioned whether there was a 
struggle between moderate Muslims and Islamic fundamentalists 58.7% or 242 
individuals felt there was indeed a struggle, and 15.8% (65 people) indentified with the 
Islamic fundamentalists in this struggle.  Additionally, when asked if the individual felt 
there was a conflict between Islam and modernity 48.3% felt there was a conflict.  
Following the same identification line, 71.8% of the respondents felt there was a strong 
sense of Muslim identity in Great Britain with 28.2% raking it very strong, and 86.3% of 
these respondents identifying this as a good thing.   
Identification of external protagonist 
 Within the list of potential radicalizing elements is the sense that others are to 
blame for the struggles of the individual or the group they are associated with.  The 
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perception of social, financial, or political persecution are strong catalysts toward 
radicalization.  Respondents were asked if they felt Muslim nations should be more 
prosperous than they are today.  The response was an overwhelming 83.7% (345) of 
those surveyed felt that Muslim nations should be more prosperous.  These respondents 
were then asked who they felt was to blame for the lack of Muslim prosperity and while 
27.0% felt it was due to the lack of education in the Muslim world and 35.9% felt it was a 
result of corruption in the government of Muslim countries, still 17.4% felt that the 
policies of the United States and other Western nations were to blame for the economic 
problems in the Muslim nations. 
 The identification of an external protagonist can be the foundations of frustration 
that can potentially serve to drive an individual toward radicalization.  Additionally, it is 
central to the development of the us-vs-them paradigm that develops in the latter stages 
of the radicalization process. 
Conflict  
With Western countries seen as the protagonist in the struggle for Islamic success, 
it should be considered how the British Muslims view the compatibility of Western 
Democracy within Muslim countries.  The survey offers the statement that Democracy is 
a western way that won’t work in most Muslim counties.  When given this statement 59% 
felt that Democracy would work well, but 29.9% answered that Democracy would not 
work well in Muslim countries.   
 Additionally when asked whether they considered relations between Muslims 
around the world and people in western countries to be generally good or bad, only 
23.3% indicated they felt relations were generally good while 62.1% responded that they 
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considered these relations to be generally bad.  Further, when asked who they thought 
was to blame for these bad relations, of those who responded in this manner only 10.5% 
indicated they Muslims were to blame, while 47.7% blamed people in Western countries 
and Christians, 0.8% blamed Jews and 29.3% felt both Muslims and Westerners were to 
blame. 
Concern for the future of Muslims 
 Another potential source of frustration leading to radicalization is a sense of 
disenfranchisement that would lead one to question the future viability of the individual 
or the group to exist in the current environment.  When questioned regarding the 
individuals concern for the future of Muslims in the country, fully 80.3 % were either 
very concerned or somewhat concerned with over 50% being very concerned.  While 
there are several independent variables that allow for the identification of the source of 
this concern, the importance of this measurement lies in the combined effect with the 
perception that there are external threats to the future of the Muslim population in Britain.  
Perceived connection with terrorist figure 
 One of the indicators along the path to radicalization is the beginning of a 
perceived connection to a terrorist group or figure.  As discussed previously, John 
Horgan lists this association with the group or leader as central to the individual’s process 
of becoming a terrorist. Within the survey the respondents were asked how much 
confidence they had in Osama bin Laden.  There were a significant number who had little 
or no confidence in Bin Laden; 11.2% not too much confidence and 57.3% had no 
confidence at all.  However, 10.4% had some confidence and 4.6% had a lot of 
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confidence, totaling 15.0% who has at least some degree of confidence in Osama bin 
Laden.   
 
Refusing to accept reality   
Crenshaw suggests that when an individual is on the path to radicalization, they 
begin a pattern of refusing to accept realities that are not in keeping with their newly 
found radical ideology.  While many of the previous questions are subjective in nature, 
asking who the individual felt was responsible for certain conditions, there is one 
question on the survey that allows us to consider the individuals willingness to accept 
what is known to be true and would certainly be at odds with a radical Islamist ideology.  
When asked, Do you believe that groups of Arabs carried out the attacks against the 
United States (the World Trade Center and the Pentagon) on September 11, 2001, only 
18.2% of the respondents indicated that they believe Arabs were responsible.  Fully 
53.6% did not believe that Arabs were involved and 27.9% indicated they did not know.  
Given that it is well documented who was involved in the hijacking of the airplanes and 
the use of those planes as guided missiles into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 
added to the fact that Osama bin Laden himself has praised those who were involved, it is 
of great interest that so many respondents choose not to accept what is known by most to 
be the truth. 
Acceptance of violence as a tactic 
 How an individual feels about the use of violence as an acceptable means of 
political protest will carry considerable weight on the radicalization scale.  It should be 
considered that as a respondent becomes more radicalized they would be more willing to 
consider violence as an acceptable method of expressing political discontent.  This 
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variable can potentially be considered the tipping point for radicalization.  It represents 
the willingness or unwillingness of the subject to potentially move beyond legal means of 
political expression to illegal violent action.  Living “outside normal standards” is a 
shared experience for radicalized people participating in violent political action (Porta, 
1995). 
Thus, moving further along the radicalization continuum, gaining insight into the views 
of the respondent as they relate to suicide bombing will serve as a capstone to the 
measurement of the individual’s potentiality for radicalization.  Being willing to sacrifice 
one’s own life, or at least agreeing with the concept can be seen as the pinnacle of 
radicalization that would make one susceptible to terrorist ideology and recruitment into a 
terrorist organization or cell.  An individual who finds suicide bombing to be acceptable 
will most likely have responses supporting a high degree of radicalization from bottom to 
top.  Hoffman (2006) points out that the suicide bomber is one who is revered in terrorist 
groups.  Special privileges are given to those who are to become martyrs, and martyrdom 
“has become an ambition for Palestinian children” (Hoffman 2006, 158). 
 When asked how the respondent felt about suicide bombing 3.2% felt it was often 
justified, 13.1% felt it was sometimes justified, and 9.7% suicide bombing as rarely 
justified, for a total of 26.0% who felt that suicide bombing was in some way justified.  
The remaining 74% were divided among those who felt it was never justified (68%) or   
either didn’t know or refused (6%). 
 Using these variables to create a vulnerability to radicalization score for each 
respondent, it was then possible to perform analysis to determine the relationship 
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between the independent variables and radicalization vulnerability, and the strength of 
that relationship.  
 Independent Variables 
 Independent variables for this study  include age, education, employment, 
income, overall level of satisfaction, immigration status (citizenship), heritage, having a 
bad experience due to race, ethnicity, or religion, and religiosity.   
Age  
Knowing the age of respondents is important to understanding whether there is 
indeed any particular demographic that could be considered more susceptible to 
radicalization.  It is generally considered that Muslims between the ages of 17 and 29 
make up the majority of this radicalized group (Crenshaw 2000; Sageman 2004).  If it can 
be found that radicalization occurs more often within a certain age group, this will allow 
for the targeting of potential sources of radicalizing phenomenon.  For example, if it is 
determined that radicalization occurs more often among individuals over the age of 
twenty five, then consideration would be given to the potential radicalizing variables 
associated with college and the post college experience.  In order to facilitate analysis the 
respondents were grouped and represented as follows: 18-29 years of age (42%), ages 30-
39 (33.5%), ages 40-49 (12.4%), and over 50 years of age (10%).   
 
Gender 
While it is generally considered that most terrorists are male, this is a 
misconception.  Females have been used effectively in terrorist campaigns ranging from 
the Red Brigade in Germany, the anti-colonial terrorist campaign in Algeria, to the 
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modern insurgency in Iraq and the use of female suicide bombers.  Even within the 
Muslim population it would be a mistake to think that only men are susceptible to 
radicalization and recruitment into a terrorist cell or group, or even committing terrorist 
acts as a ‘lone wolf’.  The Muslim respondents of this survey were divided proportionally 
with 52.4% being male and 47.6% being female.  This method of identification is used to 
determine if there is a large percentage of female respondents who are at risk of terrorist 
radicalization. 
Social satisfaction 
 Social satisfaction is an essential consideration.  Understanding the social 
satisfaction measure provides insight into the degree of marginalization that is felt by the 
Muslim sample.  Issues of discrimination, lack of political efficacy, and persecution can 
potentially create strong feelings of dissatisfaction that can motivate the individual to 
participate in civil protest.  This measure can be seen as a reflection of the 
frustration/aggression hypothesis put forth by Post (1998), where dissatisfaction is seen 
as a catalyst to aggressive action. 
 Feelings of alienation or disenfranchisement can be a result of many factors.  
Immigration, social, and security policies may create these conditions.  Additionally, 
failure of the immigrant population to assimilate within their new host country can also 
add to these feelings.  A perception of non-inclusion can also be seen as a compelling 
reason to participate in civil protest.  With no outlet for civil discourse, the concern is that 
young Muslims will choose to engage in violence to institute change (Kfir 2007). 
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 The survey of British Muslims found that while 50.5% of the respondents were 
satisfied, fully 37.9% or 156 individuals were dissatisfied with the way things were going 
in their country, 11.4% didn’t know and one individual refused to answer.   
 
Education level 
Education is seen as key for several reasons.  The limiting effects of lacking a 
high school education can potentially serve as an avenue for frustration leading to 
criminality and radicalization.  With the radicalizing influences on college campus, 
understanding how many college students might exhibit signs of radicalization can be 
very informative.  Lastly, in light of recent terrorist attempts by college-educated 
individuals, it must be considered whether radicalization might occur after the education 
process is completed and the individual is exposed to other influences like limited 
employment opportunities or wage discrimination that could contribute strongly to the 
radicalization.   
 Within this survey, the education levels were divided and represented as follows: 
Table 2 Education levels in Great Britain 
Level of Education   Percentage 
No qualifications 9.0% 
GCSE grades D or below 5.1% 
GCSE grades A-C 18.2% 
A Level exam 24.8% 
College degree, teaching, or nursing 
cert. 
20.9% 
Upper level degree 12.6% 
Other qualifications 7.0% 
Don’t know 1.5% 
Refused 1.0% 
 
 It is necessary to understand that there are examinations administered at different 
times during the individual’s education and the education variable for this analysis is a 
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combination of test scores at these levels and higher education levels that would correlate 
more closely to the American model of higher education.  GCSE exams are administered 
when British students are 15-16 years of age.  These exams are subject exams and are 
graded on a A-G scale with A being the highest.  Therefore, according to figure 2, 5.1% 
of the Muslim population that took this exam scored at the D or below level and this was 
their highest level experience with the educational system.  Similarly 18.2% scored C or 
better but chose not to advance to the A level exams that are considered the equivilant to 
a college entrance exam of which 24.8% took this exam but did not complete a college 
degree.  From this point the British system is easily understood as compared to the 
American educational system. 
It should be considered that with nearly 14.1% of the Muslim population lacking 
what can be considered a completed high school education; there is the potential for 
poverty within the Muslim community that is disproportionate to the population as a 
whole.  This break down provides the opportunity to examine the relationship between 
education and the risk of radicalization. 
Income levels 
 Income will be measured to determine if there is any validity to the concept of 
economic limitations and frustration.  The Pew Research Center’s 2007 report indicates 
there is a significant income gap between Muslims and non-Muslims in Great Britain at 
every level of income. This report shows that while the 23% of the general population 
exceeded 40,000 pounds per year of income only 13% of Muslims achieved this income 
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level.  More concerning is the knowledge that 61% of Muslims make under 20,000 
pounds per year compared to 39% of the overall population.5   
Exposure to racial or religious discrimination 
Understanding the level to which a Muslim individual has been exposed to 
domestic security measures/violence allows for an analysis of whether the perception of 
Muslims being targeted for such action can be considered valid.  While it is known that 
“stop and searches” have steadily risen in Great Britain, it is essential to gain an 
understanding regarding the influence this and other policies has had on the Muslim 
population and how such an action is viewed by that group (Poynting & Mason 2006).   
Exposure to racial or religious discrimination and violence is the variable to be 
considered.  Respondents indicated whether they have had a bad experience due to race, 
ethnicity, or religion.  While 70.1 percent report no bad experiences, 29.6% or 122 out of 
412 reported having a bad experience due to race, ethnicity, or religion.  These bad 
experiences can be considered one of the catalysts that could potential ‘drive’ someone 
toward radicalization.   
Immigration status and citizenship 
Immigration, citizenship, and heritage will be obtained in order to categorize the 
respondents to determine if there is any pattern of radicalization among a particular group 
(South Asians, Middle Eastern immigrants, or North African Muslims).  Further, 
citizenship will be broken down to determine if the respondents are first generation 
immigrants or the children/grandchildren of Muslim immigrants.  Citizenship is used to 
establish if the individual is a non-citizen immigrant, an immigrated British citizen, or a 
                                                 
5 Pew Research Center, May 22, 2007. Muslim Americans, Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream. 
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naturally born British Muslim.  The findings are that 46.1% (190) report being born in 
Great Britain’s with 53.6% (221) having been born in another country.  Of the 221 not 
born in GB, 58.4% report having immigrated over 15 years ago; 12.7% arrived between 
6-10 years ago; 8.1% within the last 3-5 years; and 6.8% within the last two years.  This 
data is critical and is used to analyze the relationship to the susceptibility to radicalization 
among immigrants as well as among those born in Great Britain.  Of the 412 respondents 
fully 90.3% are British citizens.  Counties of origin range from all over the Middle East, 
Asia and North Africa.  The largest ancestral or ethnic groups are as follows: Pakistan 
55.3%; India 12.9%; Bangladesh 10.7%; and other at 12.9% (with no further specificity).  
Reaction to the War on Terror 
Many have speculated that the ‘War on Terror’ that is led by the United States 
with the assistance of its allies, Great Britain being our principle ally, has been the main 
catalyst to radicalization among the Muslim Diaspora.  Respondents were asked if they 
favored or opposed the U.S. led effort to fight terrorism.  While forty individuals (9.7%) 
either didn’t know or refused, 12.9% were in favor of the U.S led effort to fight terrorism 
while 77.4% (319) were opposed to this effort.   
Religiosity 
 Religiosity is measured to determine if a respondent is simply Muslim by heritage 
or if they are a practicing Muslim who may potentially be subjected to radical Islamist 
ideology while attending services in the Mosque.  It is well known that certain Imams 
preach a radicalized form of Islam and call on their members to join the jihad.   
Several questions address Mosque attendance and reliance on religious leaders for 
guidance.  When questioned regarding the importance of religion, 87.4% of the 
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respondents indicated that it was very important; 10.9% felt it was somewhat important; 
with the remaining 1.7% ranging from not too important to not at all with three people 
who either didn’t know or refused to answer.  It has already been discussed that when 
asked how they identify themselves, fully 81.8% considered themselves Muslim first and 
British second; 7.5% felt they were both equally; and 7% responded British first.  Within 
this category of religiosity, when respondents were asked how often they attended the 
mosque for salah and Jum’ah prayer 30.6% indicated more than once per week; 23.3% 
attended once per week; 4.6% once per month and 10.9% only a few times per year.  
Interestingly 30% of the respondents either seldom or never attended mosque for prayers.  
This is an interesting statistic when juxtaposed with the responses to who the respondents 
looked to for guidance on Islam.  In response to this question 43.7% looked to their local 
Imam or sheik; 26.9% to Imams and institutions outside their country like al-Azhar or the 
Saudi Imams of Mecca and Medina; 15.8% indicated that they did not seek guidance 
from any of the sources listed in the survey but offered no alternate answers. 
Geographic location 
When one considers the radicalizing effect of some Muslim religious leaders who 
are markedly anti-Western, and who call for individuals to join the jihad, it should be 
considered that geographic location will be important to know.  Within the survey group 
72.3% of the respondents were located in the Yorkshire region of Great Britain, 20.9% in 
Granada, 4.1% in Tyne Teen, and the remainder were scattered among five other regions.  
With this data it may be possible to consider if there is a geographical concentration of 




Hypothesis #1: Vulnerability to radicalization is a result of age, education level, and/or 
income. 
 
Important to understanding the vulnerability to radicalization is an examination of the 
demographics of the population and how these factors relate to the levels of vulnerability 
within the group.  In order to understand these relations the age, sex, education level, and 
income of the respondents was tested to determine if there was any relationship between 
these variables and the respondent’s vulnerability to radicalization.  Literature in the field 
would indicate that individuals who are the most vulnerable to radicalization would be 
younger males, less educated, and existing at the lower end of the income scale.  
Therefore, there will be a negative relationship between age, education level, and income 
and increasing levels of vulnerability to radicalization.  Further, as the vulnerability to 
radicalization rises there will be a rise in the percentage of males. 
 
Hypothesis #2: Frustration among the members of the Muslim community in Great 
Britain is responsible for their vulnerability to radicalization 
 
There are variables that allow for an investigation into impact of social and 
political frustration on the individuals vulnerability to radicalization.  The premise of the 
frustration aggression theory is that as levels of frustration increase there will be an 
increase in the individual’s willingness to engage in terrorist activity.  This being the 
case, as the percentage of responses indicating a justification for frustration increases, we 
will find an increased level of vulnerability to radicalization.   
As the percentage of respondents who had a bad experience due to race, ethnicity, 
or religion increases there will be a correlated increase in the vulnerability score.  It is 
well established that individuals who became radicalized and joined the IRA were often 
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motivated by the mistreatment of themselves or those they knew at the hands of the 
British Authority. 
As the vulnerability score increases there will be an increase in the percentage of 
respondents who express dissatisfaction with the current conditions within Great Britain 
and express concern regarding the future of Muslims in the country.  Dissatisfaction or 
perceived injustices are central to the frustration aggression theory previously discussed.  
It is reasonable to consider that individuals, who are dissatisfied, in keeping with this 
theory, would be vulnerable to radicalization. 
It is well known that the 9-11 hijackers were recent immigrants to Germany who 
became radicalized shortly upon their arrival from their home countries.  It is thought that 
when immigrants first arrive to their new host country they become isolated and 
disaffected as their opportunities do not meet with their expectations.  This perception of 
discrimination or injustice, in keeping with the frustration aggression theory, makes the 
individual susceptible to terrorist radicalization.  If this phenomenon is to hold true, those 
respondents who have immigrated to Great Britain and remain in country longer will be 
less vulnerable to radicalization and therefore the length of stay will have a negative 
relationship with vulnerability.  Along these same lines, those who are naturally born 
British citizens should be less prone to radicalization and have lower vulnerability to 





Hypothesis #3: Dissatisfaction with the policies of the United States is the source of the 
vulnerability to radicalization within the Muslim community in Great Britain. 
 
As the ‘war on terror’ is seen by many Muslims as a ‘war on Islam’, it is 
important to understand how the respondents view the U.S. led war on terror as it related 
to their individual vulnerability score, particularly since Great Britain is an important ally 
to the United States in this effort.  Given the sentiment of the Muslim community to this 
action, an increase in the percentage of individuals who oppose the U.S. led efforts to 
combat terrorism should correlate to an increase in the individual scores relating to the 
vulnerability of radicalization. 
 
Hypothesis #4: Individuals who are more religious within the Muslim community are 
more vulnerable to radicalization. 
 
The power of the radical Islamist message is seen as a serious threat in combating 
terrorism.  It is well known and established in the previously presented literature that this 
message often promulgates from within the established religious institutions, the 
mosques.  The individual who is exposed to radical ideology within the mosque is at risk 
of becoming radicalized as they view the leaders as individuals of authority.  As the 
individual becomes radicalized, their attendance at the mosque becomes more frequent.  
Therefore, with a higher frequency in mosque attendance there will be an increase in the 
vulnerability score.  Additionally, there will be a strong correlation regarding who the 




ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Hypothesis #1: 
 As a result of the analysis that was performed using cross tabulation it is possible 
to determine the viability of the hypothesis that higher levels of vulnerability to 
radicalization are a result of youth, sex, education and income level.  Within the survey 
set of Muslims in Great Britain thirty one individuals or 7.5% were found to be highly 
vulnerable to radicalization, 218 of those surveyed (52.9%) were moderately vulnerable, 
and the remaining 163 respondents (39.6%) had a low degree of vulnerability to 
radicalization.  Interestingly when each level is examined in detail, patterns do in fact 
begin to develop.   
Of the thirty one highly vulnerable respondents, twenty were between 18 and 28 
years of age, eight were 30-39 years of age, one was in the 40-49 age grouping and two 
of the respondents who were highly vulnerable to terrorist radicalization were over 50 
years old.  Of the two hundred eighteen who were moderately vulnerable, 47.2% or one 
hundred three respondents were 18-29 years old, seventy-three or 33.5% were 30-39 
years old,  twenty-three were 40-49 and nineteen were over 50 years old.  Of those who 
were the least vulnerable to radicalization fifty-nine (36.2%) were 18-29, fifty-seven 
(35.0%) were 30-39, twenty-seven (16.6%) were 40-49, and twenty (12.3%) were over 
50 years old. 
While it is commonly held that males are more vulnerable to radicalization, the 
findings of this analysis would suggest otherwise.  It is important to state that the sample 
of 412 respondents contained 216 males (52.4%) and 196 females (47.6%).  Within the 
sample group that was highly vulnerable to radicalization 51.6% or sixteen of the thirty 
one were in fact female, with the remaining fifteen being male.  Similar results were 
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found within the group that is considered to be moderately vulnerable to radicalization 
with 111 or 50.9% of the 218 respondents who are moderately vulnerable being female.  
As can be seen in table 3 only the group that is considered to have the lowest 
vulnerability to radicalization contains more male respondents (52.4%) than females 
(42.3%).   
 
Table 3 Male / Female 
 
 
   Sex 
 Radicalization  Male Female Total 
 high vulnerability Count 15 16 31 
% within vulnerability scores 48.4% 51.6% 100.0% 
% within Sex 6.9% 8.2% 7.5% 
moderate vulnerability Count 107 111 218 
% within vulnerability scores 49.1% 50.9% 100.0% 
% within Sex 49.5% 56.6% 52.9% 
low vulnerability Count 94 69 163 
% within vulnerability scores 57.7% 42.3% 100.0% 
% within Sex 43.5% 35.2% 39.6% 
Total Count 216 196 412 
% within vulnerability scores 52.4% 47.6% 100.0% 
% within Sex 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 Another common assumption regarding ‘who becomes a terrorist’ is that they are 
single.  Within this study, of the thirty-one respondents who were highly vulnerable 
thirteen had never been married, one was separated, one was divorced, and sixteen were 
married.  The numbers are even more surprising in the moderately vulnerable category 
were seventy-two of the two hundred eighteen had never been married but one hundred 
twenty-five respondents in this category were married when interviewed.  
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Continuing to consider the male-female paradox, education was analyzed to 
examine the relationship with the individual’s vulnerability to radicalization and their 
level of completed education or performance on exam levels as can be seen in table 4 at 
the end of this discussion.  While it is considered that those with the least education 
would be the most vulnerable to radicalization, only thirty-seven respondents were found 
to had no qualifications.  Of these only two (one male, one female) were considered 
highly vulnerable to radicalization, while seventeen (eight male and nine female) were 
moderately vulnerable, leaving thirteen males and five females to comprise the remaining 
eighteen respondents in the low vulnerability group that had no educational qualification. 
 Of the respondents that stayed in school long enough to take the GCSE exams but 
scored D or below, only one female was within the highly vulnerable group.  The twelve 
that were moderately vulnerable were evenly divided among male and female as were the 
remaining eight that had a low vulnerability to radicalization.  Respondents who scored C 
or better on the GCSE exams were more numerous with 75 having achieved this level of 
education.  Of these, six were highly vulnerable to radicalization (three males, three 
females), forty-four were moderately vulnerable with twenty-four females and twenty 
males, and twenty-five (12 males, 13 females) had a low vulnerability to radicalization.   
The largest group within the education variable was those who had risen to take 
the A-Level exams for college entrance.  While there is no discussion regarding if or how 
much the respondent attended college, it is clear, however, that they sat for these exams 
but did not complete college to the level of achieving a degree.  Of the one hundred two 
individuals who took the A level exam, seven women and five men comprise the twelve 
who ranked as being highly vulnerable to radicalization, fifty-six (thirty four women and 
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twenty-two men) were moderately vulnerable, while the remaining thirty-four 
respondents, twenty-two women and twelve men, had a low vulnerability score.   
Higher education is thought to minimize the individual’s vulnerability to 
radicalization.  Of the eighty-six respondents that, at minimum, had completed a college 
degree, five were highly vulnerable to radicalization, forty-two were moderately 
vulnerable and thirty-nine had low vulnerability. This is the first level where the number 
of men exceeded the number of women in every level of vulnerability.  Higher level 
degrees (Masters level or PhD) was the second highest group with eighty-seven 
respondents, with only one male who scored as being highly vulnerable to radicalization.  
Sixteen men and eleven women, for a total of twenty-seven, were moderately vulnerable, 
with the remaining twenty-four respondents (18 men, 6 women) having a low 
vulnerability to radicalization.  The twenty-nine who indicated they had other levels of 
qualification were made up of two men and two women who were highly vulnerable, 
fourteen (8 men, 6 women) who were moderately vulnerable and seven men and four 
women for a total of eleven who had a low vulnerability score.  The remaining ten 





Table 4 Vulnerability / Education 
 
   vulnerability to radicalization (VR) scores (DV) 
 Education  high  moderate  low  Total 
 No qualifications obtained Count 2 17 18 37
% within VR scores 6.5% 7.8% 11.0% 9.0%
GCSE or O level grades D or 
below / CSE grades 2 or 
below 
Count 1 12 8 21
% within VR scores 3.2% 5.5% 4.9% 5.1%
GCSE or O level grades A-C / 
CSE grade 1/ NVQ 2 
Count 6 44 25 75
% within VR scores 19.4% 20.2% 15.3% 18.2%
A level / NVQ 3 Count 12 56 34 102
% within VR scores 38.7% 25.7% 20.9% 24.8%
Degree / HND / teaching or 
nursing certificates / NVQ 4 
Count 5 42 39 86
% within VR scores 16.1% 19.3% 23.9% 20.9%
Higher degree (masters, PHD, 
NVQ 5) 
Count 1 27 24 52
% within VR scores 3.2% 12.4% 14.7% 12.6%
Other qualification Count 4 14 11 29
% within VR scores 12.9% 6.4% 6.7% 7.0%
Don't know Count 0 2 4 6
% within VR scores .0% .9% 2.5% 1.5%
Refused Count 0 4 0 4
% within VR scores .0% 1.8% .0% 1.0%
Total Count 31 218 163 412
% within VR scores 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
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Lastly, within this hypothesis, it is generally considered that poverty is a source or root 
cause of radicalization.  With the poverty line in Great Britain for a couple with no 
children at 183 pounds per week, this places the annual poverty figure at just under 
10,000 pounds per year for a family of two, less for single individuals and more for those 
with children.  Table 5 allows for the examination of the relationship between income 
and levels of vulnerability to radicalization.  With ninety-one respondents (22.1%) 
making less that 10,000 pounds per year it is interesting for find only seven with a high 
vulnerability score.  As can be seen in the chart below, high vulnerability to radicalization 
can be found at all income levels with four making between 10,000-19,000 pounds, seven 
between 20,000-29,000 pounds, three at the 30,000-39,000 pounds income level, two 
making 40-49,000 pounds and three making over 50,000 pounds (BP) per year.  While 
we see 46.2% within the moderately vulnerable category making less than 10,000 
pounds, it is clear that existing at or below the poverty line does not have a significant 
impact on the vulnerability of the individual to become radicalized toward terrorism.  
Interestingly, as income goes up, the percentage of the respondents within each income 
level that are ranked in the highly vulnerable category goes up.  When income is less than 
10,000BP only 7.7% within this income group are highly vulnerable, but as income rises 
to 30-39,000BP the percentage goes up to 10.7% and reaches a high of 12.0% in the 
50,000BP and over income level.  What is evident however is there are many more 
individuals who indicate a moderate vulnerability to radicalization existing at or below 
20,000 pounds per year.  With 50% of this income level being moderately vulnerable it is 
possible to consider the validity of the argument that relies on the individual’s perception 
of poverty as a factor in the radicalization equation.  The preponderance of moderately 
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vulnerable respondents in each income level below 30,000 pounds would further support 
this argument. 
 
Table 5 Vulnerability / Income 
 
   Vulnerability to radicalization (VR) 
scores 
 Income  high  moderate low  Total 
 Less than 10,000 pounds 
 per year 
Count 7 42 42 91 
%  7.7% 46.2% 46.2% 100% 
10,000-19,999 pounds Count 4 68 47 119 
%  3.4% 57.1% 39.5% 100% 
20,000-29,999 pounds Count 7 39 29 75 
%  9.3% 52.0% 38.7% 100% 
30,000-39,999 pounds Count 3 17 8 28 
%  10.7% 60.7% 28.6% 100% 
40,000-49,999 pounds Count 2 11 5 18 
%  11.1% 62.1% 27.8% 100% 
50,000 pounds and over Count 3 10 12 25 
%  12.0% 40.0% 48.0% 100% 
Don’t know  Count 4 20 12 36 
%  11.1% 55.5% 33.4% 100% 
Refused Count 1 11 8 20 
%  5.0% 55.0% 40.0 100% 
Total Count 31 218 163 412 






  When one considers the potential impact of security policy and racial intolerance 
in Great Britain, it would be easy to consider these abuses as having a strong influence on 
the radicalization of the Muslim population.  However, the analysis shows (Table 6) that 
of the one hundred and twenty two respondents who indicated they had a bad experience 
due to race, ethnicity, or religion; only ten, which comprise only 8.2% of those who 
report having a bad experience, were ranked as being highly vulnerable to radicalization.  
Interestingly, the remainder of the highly vulnerable group indicated no bad experience.  
The largest group that did report a bad experience was those who were moderately 
vulnerable, with eighty-one respondents (66.4%).  It is clear from table 6 that once again 
we see a large number of respondents within the moderately vulnerable category having 
had a bad experience.  The data would indicate that this event has little significance on its 
own as the majority report no bad exoperience. 
Table 6 Vulnerability / Bad experience 
 
   Bad experience due to race, ethnicity, 
religion 
 Vulnerability to 
Radicalization 
 
Yes No Don’t know Total 
 high vulnerability Count 10 21 0 31 
% within Bad 
experience due to 
race, ethnicity, religion
8.2% 7.3% .0% 7.5% 
moderate 
vulnerability 
Count 81 136 1 218 
% within Bad 
experience due to 
race, ethnicity, religion
66.4% 47.1% 100.0% 52.9% 
low vulnerability Count 31 132 0 163 
% within Bad 
experience due to 
race, ethnicity, religion
25.4% 45.7% .0% 39.6% 
Total Count 122 289 1 412 
% within Bad 
experience due to 
race, ethnicity, religion
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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 When indications of dissatisfaction with the way things are going in Great Britain 
are analyzed with the vulnerability scores, once again it is difficult to make a connection.  
It is evident in table 7 that the individual’s level of dissatisfaction with the conditions in 
Great Britain does not provide significant indications of being a source for radicalization.  
This is clear when fifteen of the thirty-one highly vulnerable respondents indicate they 
are satisfied with the way things are going.  One could hypothesize that this satisfaction is 
based upon the tumultuous conditions in Great Britain and the growing influence of the 
radical Muslim community but this would be speculative at best.  The questions asked 
and the associated data provide no way to make such estimation.  It is interesting 
however to consider that those who were moderately vulnerable, again show a level of 
dissatisfaction higher that those who were satisfied making up 66% of the entire group 
that was dissatisfied. 
Table 7 Vulnerability / Satisfaction 
 
 
   Now thinking about Great Britain, overall, are you 
satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going 








know Refused Total 
 high  Count 15 10 6 0 31
 7.2% 6.4% 12.8% .0% 7.5%
moderate  Count 95 103 19 1 218
 45.7% 66.0% 40.4% 100.0% 52.9%
low  Count 98 43 22 0 163
 47.1% 27.6% 46.8% .0% 39.6%
Total Count 208 156 47 1 412




Given the recent attack in Western Europe, including Great Britain, by Muslim 
immigrants, there is considerable desire to understand the impact of the immigrant 
population as it pertains to terrorist radicalization.  By doing a cross tabular analysis of 
the vulnerability scores with the measure of the individuals having been naturally born in 
Great Britain or having immigrated, it is possible to make such a determination.  As can 
be seen in table 8, there does not seem to be a clear indication that being an immigrant 
make one any more likely to be vulnerable to radicalization that does being a naturally 
born citizen.  Of the thirty-one highly radicalized respondents the majority (19) were born 
in Great Britain, with the remaining twelve having been born outside the country.  
Among the 218 individuals who were moderately vulnerable, 110 were born in country 
and 107 outside Great Britain. 
Table 8 Vulnerability / Born in Great Britain 
 
   Were you born in (country) or in another country?
 Vulnerability to 
radicalization 
 Born in 
(Country) 
Another 
country Refused Total 
 high  Count 19 12 0 31
 10.0% 5.4% .0% 7.5%
moderate  Count 110 107 1 218
 57.9% 48.4% 100.0% 52.9%
low  Count 61 102 0 163
 32.1% 46.2% .0% 39.6%
Total Count 190 221 1 412
 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
 
What is most interesting regarding the question of radicalization among the immigrant 
population is that of the twelve highly vulnerable immigrants only two arrived within two 
years of being interviewed.   There was one respondent each in the 3-5 years, 6-10 years, 
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and 11-15 years, but there were seven individuals who had been in the country for over 
15 years who ranked highly vulnerable to radicalization.  While those who were 
moderately vulnerable were more evenly distributed there were only eight who had been 
in the country less than two years and seven between 3 and 5 years.  Fifteen of the 
moderately vulnerable group had been in Great Britain between 6 and 10 years and 
seventeen had arrived between 11 and 15 years ago.  Most interesting is that of those 
immigrants who were moderately vulnerable to terrorist radicalization, a total of fifty-
nine respondents had come to Great Britain over 15 years previous to being a part of the 
survey.  Conventional wisdom and the literature would indicate that new arrivals would 
be the most vulnerable to radicalization as a result of their lack of assimilation, limited 
opportunities, and isolation from their culture; but the data would seem to indicate that 
exactly the opposite could be the case.   
 An examination of the ancestry of the respondents who immigrated over 15 years 
prior to the survey shows that of those highly vulnerable to radicalization two were from 
Bangladesh, one from India, three from Pakistan, and one other (not specified).  Of those 
who were moderately vulnerable and had been in Great Britain over 15 years, one was 
from Algeria, five from India, one from Iran, one from Morocco, thirty-eight were from 
Pakistan, one from Somalia, and there were five others (not specified).  In both groups 
the immigrants from Pakistan make up the majority but this is not unexpected given that 
seventy-six of the one hundred twenty nine respondents who immigrated over 15 years 
prior to the survey are from Pakistan and those of Pakistani ancestry represent 55.3% of 
the 412 individuals that were surveyed.  Therefore, it is consistent that nineteen of the 
thirty-one respondents who were ranked as highly vulnerable to terrorist radicalization 
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are of Pakistani ancestry.  Of the remaining twelve, four were from Bangladesh, four 
from India, and four either scored other (not specified) or didn’t know.   
 Further analysis of immigrant status and vulnerability become particularly 
interesting when examined within the age groupings previously discussed.  Of the 
nineteen respondents who were born in Great Britain with high vulnerability scores, 
fourteen are between 18 and 29 years of age, with only six immigrants within this age 
group being highly vulnerable, accounting for twenty of the thirty-one respondents that 
had a high vulnerability score.  Table 9 provides a breakdown according to having been 
born in Great Britain or in another country as compared to age groupings within the 
vulnerability paradigm. 
Table 9 Vulerability / Age 
 
Were you born in (country) or in another country? 
age groupings 
18-29 30-39 40-49 over 50 Total 
Born in 
(Country) 
 high VR score 
% within age groupings 
14 4 1 0 19
11.8% 6.8% 14.3% .0% 10.0%
Moderate VR score 
% within age groupings 
68 35 3 4 110
57.1% 59.3% 42.9% 80.0% 57.9%
low VR score 
% within age groupings 
37 20 3 1 61
31.1% 33.9% 42.9% 20.0% 32.1%
Total 119 59 7 5 190
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Another 
country 
 high VR score 
% within age groupings 
6 4 0 2 12
9.7% 5.1% .0% 5.6% 5.4%
moderate VR score 
% within age groupings 
34 38 20 15 107
54.8% 48.1% 45.5% 41.7% 48.4%
low VR score 
% within age groupings 
22 37 24 19 102
35.5% 46.8% 54.5% 52.8% 46.2%
Total 62 79 44 36 221
100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Refused radicalization 
scores 
moderate VR score 
% within age groupings 
1    1
100.0%    100.0%
Total 1    1






 In order to test the impact of United States policy and actions on the vulnerability 
to radicalization, three questions were examined to determine whether there was any 
consistency in response to U.S. policy in the War on Terror among the varied 
vulnerability groups.  First, was the response to the question regarding the United States 
war on terror and whether the individual was in favor or not in favor of this action.  Of 
the thirty-one who were highly vulnerable to radicalization, twenty-nine were not in favor 
of the U.S. led war on terror and two were in favor.  The moderately vulnerable group of 
two hundred eighteen respondents also showed an overwhelming disfavor with the U.S. 
action with one hundred sixty-seven who were not in favor and only thirty-two who were 
in favor of the U.S. led war on terror, with the remaining nineteen either not knowing or 
refusing.  Surprisingly, even the low vulnerability group expressed similar sentiments 
with one hundred twenty-three of the one hundred sixty-three within this group not in 
favor of the U.S. effort.  All totaled, of the four hundred twelve respondents, three 
hundred nineteen were not in favor of the U.S. led war on terror.    
 Another area where insight can be provided is in responses to how much of a 
threat the U.S. presence in Iraq poses to Middle East stability.  Within the entire sample, 
two hundred seventy one respondents felt it posed a great danger and eighty six saw it as 
a moderate danger.  Among the vulnerability groups the one with the highest 
vulnerability was divided among the twenty-five who saw the U.S. presence as a great 
danger and the remaining six who felt it was a moderate danger.  The moderately 
vulnerable group contained one hundred fifty-six respondents who felt it was a great 
danger to stability and thirty-six who saw this action as having a moderately dangerous 
effect.  There were, however, nine within this group that felt the U.S. presence in Iraq 
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posed only a small danger to stability and five felt it was no danger at all.  The low 
vulnerability group contained ninety who saw this as a great danger, forty-four 
considered in a moderate danger, four felt it posed no danger, and twenty-five indicated 
they did not know. 
 Another area where U.S. policy or action has had an impact on Muslims is the 
media’s reporting of incidents in U.S. prisons at Abu Graib in Iraq, and Guantanamo Bay 
Cuba.  Exposure to these media reports is considered to be another factor that could 
possibly promote radicalization among the Muslim community.  When questioned if they 
had heard the reports of abuses at these prisons, three hundred seventy-seven of the group 
had heard them, while seventy-four had not and one did not know.  Table 10 provides a 
breakdown that shows twenty-six of the thirty-one highly vulnerable respondents had 
heard of the abuses.  The moderately vulnerable group also had a high number of 
individuals (177) who had heard of the U.S. abuses in these prisons, as had one hundred 
thirty-four in the low vulnerability group.  While it is clear the majority of the 
respondents are aware of the reports of abuses, these events do not seem to indicate a 
strong influence on the vulnerability to radicalization as knowledge is spread throughout 




Table 10 Vulnerability / Reporting of abuses 
 
   Heard about reports about abuses in American 
run prisons at Abu Graib, Guantanamo  
and elsewhere 
 
  VR Scores  Yes – have 
heard of it 
No – have not 
heard of it 
Don't 
know Total 
 high  Count 26 5 0 31
% within Heard 
about reports  7.7% 6.8% .0% 7.5%
moderate  Count 177 41 0 218
% within Heard 
about reports  52.5% 55.4% .0% 52.9%
low  Count 134 28 1 163
% within Heard 
about reports  39.8% 37.8% 100.0% 39.6%
Total Count 337 74 1 412
% within Heard 





 While the terrorist literature suggests that Islamist terrorists are more politically 
than religiously motivated, vulnerability as a result of religious involvement within the 
Muslim community has become a major concern given the revelations of local imams 
like Abu Hamza preaching anti-western sermons calling for jihad against the United 
States and the West.  Within Great Britain there is considerable concern regarding the 
effect of these radical imams and how much they are influencing the religious community 
toward terrorist radicalization.  There are three variables that allow for some measure of 
the relationship between religious involvement and identity and the vulnerability to 
radicalization.  First among these is the measure of the importance of religion to the 
respondents.  Within the highly vulnerable group, thirty of the thirty-one respondents 
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indicated that religion was very important and the remaining one individual felt it was 
somewhat important.  This pattern holds true throughout the vulnerability groups with 
three hundred and sixty of the four hundred twelve respondents indicating religion was 
very important and forty-five responding that it was somewhat important.  Only seven 
respondents offered any other answer indicating not too importance, no importance, or 
didn’t know or refused.   
 When respondents were asked how strong they felt the Muslim identity was 
within Great Britain.  Within the study group, two hundred ninety-six respondents 
indicated they felt that the Muslim identity is either very or fairy strong, with only eighty- 
one indicating not too strong and twenty four felt it was not strong at all.  When these 
responses are analyzed with regard to the vulnerability scores, sixteen of the highly 
vulnerable respondents felt the Muslim identity was very strong and nine considered it to 
be fairly strong.  Only five felt it was not too strong and one saw it as not strong at all.  
This was the only vulnerability group where the very strong’s outnumbered the fairly 
strong respondents.  Within the moderately vulnerable group, seventy-seven felt it was 
very strong, ninety-nine responded it was fairly strong, twenty-eight not too strong, and 
eleven felt it was not strong at all.  The low vulnerability group comprised twenty-three 
that the Muslim identity was very strong, seventy-two saw it as fairly strong, forty-eight 
indicated it was not too strong, and twelve responded that the Muslim identity in Great 
Britain was not strong at all.  Clearly the majority of the highly vulnerable group was 
consistent in their opinion that the Muslim identity in Great Britain was either very or 
fairly strong, however six of the thirty-one respondents did not share this sentiment and 
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shows that the identification questions does not explain vulnerability across the entire 
group. 
 Respondents were asked who they went to for guidance on Islam.  This question 
offered several options ranging from their local Imam or Imam’s and institutions outside 
Great Britain, to national religious leaders, religious leaders on television, none of these 
or didn’t know.  Within the group that is considered highly vulnerable to radicalization 
twenty-eight sought guidance from either their local Imam (17 respondents) or Imams 
and institutions such as al-Azhar or the Saudi Imams of Mecca and Medina (11 
respondents).  The remaining three individuals within this category sought guidance from 
national religious leaders, leaders on television or answered none (one each).  Within the 
other two vulnerability groups there was a similar reliance on the local and foreign 
Imams but these groups contained larger numbers of respondents answering that none of 
the answers were applicable or they didn’t know.  With no alternatives offered by the 
respondent when answering no, it is not possible to determine if these individuals seek 
guidance outside the formally recognized institutions such as leaders of radical prayer 
groups or on-line religious web sites.  It would be imprudent to suggest this is the case, 
but would be an issue to be addressed in a future study. 
 An initial examination of mosque attendance as seen in table 11 would seem to 
indicate there is no relationship between mosque attendance and the individual’s 
vulnerability to radicalization.  While it is clear that across all three levels of vulnerability 
those who attend more than once per week outnumber those who attend only once a week 
and the numbers continue to decline as attendance becomes more seldom.  However such 
an assumption may be hasty.  In order to understand the impact of mosque attendance on 
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the vulnerability to terrorist radicalization it was necessary to view these findings through 
the filter of the male/female relationship.   
 When mosque attendance is viewed with the added consideration of the 
male/female paradigm, the importance regarding the frequency of mosque attendance 
changes significantly.  As we can see in table 12, when males who were highly 
vulnerable to radicalization are examined it is found that all fifteen respondents within 
this group attended mosque at least once per week with nine reporting they attended more 
than once per week.  Interesting, the females within the highly vulnerable group were 
found to either attend seldom or not at all (7 respondents), only a few times per year 
(three respondents), but the remaining five highly vulnerable females indicated that they 
attended mosque more than once per week.  Given the limitations of the role of females 
within the mosque it could be considered that those who attend infrequently or not at all 
may receive their religious training outside the mosque but no questions provide this 
insight.  However, it is significant to understand that one hundred seventy of the two 
hundred sixteen males and fifty-two of the one hundred ninety-six females addend 
mosque at least once per week.  Surprising is the difference in the number of males, 





Table 11 Vulnerability / Mosque Attendance 
 
 On average, how often do you 
attend the mosque for salah 
and Jum’ah Prayer? 
 
Vulnerability scores 
   high  moderate low  Total 
 More than once a week Count 14 69 43 126
% within  11.1% 54.8% 34.1% 100.0%
Once a week for Jum’ah Count 6 50 40 96
% within  6.2% 52.1% 41.7% 100.0%
Once or twice a month Count 0 14 5 19
% within  .0% 73.7% 26.3% 100.0%
A few times a year especially 
for (example vary by country) 
Count 3 20 22 45
% within  6.7% 44.4% 48.9% 100.0%
Seldom Count 1 13 11 25
% within  4.0% 52.0% 44.0% 100.0%
Never Count 6 50 39 95
% within  6.3% 52.6% 41.1% 100.0%
Total Count 30 216 160 406





Table 12 Vulnerability / Mosque attendance: male/female 
 
On average, how often do you attend the mosque for 
salah and  Jum’ah Prayer? 
vulnerability scores 
 
high  moderate  low  Total 
Male  More than once a week Count 9 52 35 96
%  9.4% 54.2% 36.5% 100.0%
Once a week for Jum’ah Count 6 36 32 74
%  8.1% 48.6% 43.2% 100.0%
Once or twice a month Count 0 7 4 11
%  .0% 63.6% 36.4% 100.0%
A few times a year especially 
for (example vary by country) 
Count 0 4 11 15
%   .0% 26.7% 73.3% 100.0%
Seldom Count 0 1 3 4
%  .0% 25.0% 75.0% 100.0%
Never Count 0 5 7 12
%   .0% 41.7% 58.3% 100.0%
Total Count 15 105 92 212
%   7.1% 49.5% 43.4% 100.0%
Female More than once a week Count 5 17 8 30
%   16.7% 56.7% 26.7% 100.0%
Once a week for Jum’ah Count 0 14 8 22
%   .0% 63.6% 36.4% 100.0%
Once or twice a month Count 0 7 1 8
%   .0% 87.5% 12.5% 100.0%
A few times a year especially 
for (example vary by country) 
Count 3 16 11 30
%   10.0% 53.3% 36.7% 100.0%
Seldom Count 1 12 8 21
%  4.8% 57.1% 38.1% 100.0%
Never Count 6 45 32 83
%  7.2% 54.2% 38.6% 100.0%
Total Count 15 111 68 194







 As scholars seek to identify a terrorist profile or gain understanding as to the root 
causes of terrorism, it has become increasingly clear that there is no ‘silver bullet’ in this 
endeavor.  Dispositionist theories that include the existence of some sort of psychopathy 
or a level of frustration that leads to aggression could not be confirmed within this study.  
Similarly, situational arguments centered on negative conditions such as poverty, lack of 
education, displeasure with current conditions, or bad experiences as a result of race, 
religion or ethnicity cannot fully explain why people become radicalized toward 
terrorism. There are however certain variables that were examined as a part of this 
study that provide some insight as to conditions that make individuals more vulnerable to 
terrorist radicalization. 
 Within the analysis, a bivariate correlation was done between the vulnerability to 
radicalization score (DV) and all the independent variables that were examined.  Of 
these, four were significant at the .05 level using the Kendalls Tau b measure.  They were 
the important of religion to the individual, sex, and being born in Great Britain.  There 
was a positive relationship with the importance of religion, indicating that individuals 
who were more vulnerable to radicalization considered religion to be very important.  
With regard to sex, there was a positive relationship between the level of vulnerability 
and the probability of being female.  This is of particular interest given that the ‘standard’ 
terrorist profile is being male. Another variable that measured significant at the .05 level 
was being born in Great Britain.  This is important given the commonly held assumption 
that terrorists in western democracies are usually immigrants who are newly arrived and 
bring their radical ideology with them to their new host country.  As was seen in the 
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analysis, those born in Great Britain were more vulnerable to radicalization followed 
closely by immigrant who had come to the country over fifteen years previous to being 
interviewed and had considerable time to assimilate and become encultured into British 
society.  Lastly, the profile of being single must be questioned as a result of the 
significance of being married as it relates to being vulnerable to terrorist radicalization. 
 More interesting are those variables that were measured having significance at the 
.01 level which would be considered very significant.  One commonly held perception 
was confirmed, that being the relationship between age and vulnerability.  It was 
determined that as the vulnerability scores rose, the age of the respondents went down.  
Two policy issues, the U.S. presence in Iraq and opposition to the U.S. led effort in 
combating terrorism, were both found to have positive relationships with the vulnerability 
scores and were significant at the .01 level.  Additionally, two variables within the 
religiosity hypothesis, seeking guidance from local and foreign Imams and Mosque 
attendance were also found to be positively related to increased levels of vulnerability to 
terrorist radicalization and were significant at the .01 level. 
 What does this all mean to the study of terrorist radicalization?  It should be 
considered that the fundamental assumptions that have driven research in this field need 
to be reexamined and a more multi-disciplinary approach should be considered in order 
to obtain a more substantive understanding of this phenomenon.  The dispositional and 
situational arguments should be considered as integral to each other and future research 
should be focused on identifying the combination of personalities, conditions, 
perceptions, and experiences that will provide a more complete understanding of the 
factors that influence radicalization.  With this more complex understanding it may then 
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be possible to address some of the issues that are central to creating vulnerability thereby 
affecting the availability of recruits for terrorist radicalization. 
  
Recommendations for future research 
 
 Building on this analysis of the vulnerability of Muslims in Great Britain to 
terrorist radicalization, future research will be focused on performing a comparative 
analysis of the remaining western democracies within the fifteen nation survey conducted 
by the Pew Research Center to determine the consistency of these findings across the 
broader European Muslim community.  As such an analysis will vastly increase the 
number of respondents (France-N=400 Muslims, Germany-N=413 Muslims, Spain-
N=402 Muslims); it should then be possible to engage in regression analysis that could 
provide some predictive findings regarding the relationship of certain conditions and/or 
situations and their influence on vulnerability to radicalization.  Given the potential for 
regression analysis it may then be possible to develop a panoramic picture of the 
variables that could serve as catalysts making an individual more vulnerable to terrorist 
radicalization.  Finally, the analysis of Muslims within western European democracies 
could then be compared to the findings of the analysis of Muslims within the United 
States to gain insight into the similarities and differences of the populations and what 
makes each more or less vulnerable to terrorist radicalization.  
 Attempts to engage in the identification of direct influences on radicalization will 
require additional survey questions that may or may not be answered truthfully by the 
respondents. The ongoing problem within the field of terrorism research of obtaining 
reliable data will continue to be a valid concern given the criminal nature of the terrorist 
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act and the transforming effect of radicalization on the individual’s perception.  However, 
the addition of a few more specific questions to the existing survey could provide 
valuable data.  For example, it would be beneficial to determine whether the respondent 
attended college but did not complete a degree, and if they had participated in Muslim 
student groups on campus.  Measures of unemployment would also add significantly to 
the demographic data including current employment status and past periods of 
unemployment.  Additionally, questions that identified if the respondent had traveled 
abroad, where they traveled and how often, would allow for the examination of potential 
foreign influence on Muslims who were born in Great Britain but seem to have a high 
instance of being vulnerable to terrorist radicalization.   
 While it is recognized that only a very small percentage of Muslims within Great 
Britain and other western European democracies will become radicalized toward 
terrorism, it is important to understand that with nearly two million Muslims in Great 
Britain, if one percent becomes radicalized toward terrorism there will be potentially 
20,000 Islamist terrorists in Great Britain alone.  The challenge is to provide substantive 
analysis that will allow for the identification of factors that make individuals more 
vulnerable to radicalization and implement actions and policies that, rather than serve to 
further the level of frustration and conflict within the Muslim community, will seek to 
ameliorate their impact and promote conditions that will not only limit future 












Vulnerability to Radicalization Score 
 
To develop the vulnerability to radicalization score it was necessary to attribute a score to 
the responses of the ten variable questions.  The following questions were used to 
develop the additive vulnerability score and the scoring for the varied responses is 
provided for each.  The total possible additive score was 16. 
 
Q.40.  Now I’m going to read a list of political leaders. For each, tell me how much 
confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs– a lot of 
confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence, or no confidence at all.  The 
leader was Osama bin Laden. 
 
Answer       Score 
A lot or some confidence     1 
Other answers       0 
 
 
IF RELATION GENERALLY BAD (Q7=2) response to Q.7. Do you think that 
relations these days between Muslims around the world and people in Western countries 
such as the United States and Europe are generally good or generally bad?  Those who 
answered bad. 
 
Q.8 Who do you think is mostly to blame for this, Muslims or people in Western 
countries? 
Answer       Score 
People in Western Countries     1 
Other answers       0 
 
 
ASK IF THINKS MUSLIM NATIONS SHOULD BE MORE PROSPEROUS 
(Q.10=1): 
Q.11 What is most responsible for Muslim nations’ lack of prosperity?  Is it the policies 
of the U.S. and other western nations, the lack of democracy in the Muslim world, the 
lack of education in the Muslim world, Islamic fundamentalism, or corruption in the 
government of Muslim nations? 
 
Answer       Score 
Policies of U.S. and other Western nations   2 
Lack of Democracy in Muslim world    1 








Q.30 In your opinion, how many (Muslims/people) in our country support Islamic 
extremists like al Qaeda –would you say most, many, just some or very few? 
 
Answer       Score 
Most or many       2 
Some        1 
Other answers       0 
 
 
Q.16 In your opinion, how strong a sense of Islamic identity do Muslims in our country 
have - very strong, fairly strong, not too strong, or not strong at all? 
 
Answer       Score 
Very strong       2 
Fairly strong       1 
Other answers       0 
 
 
Q.5 Now on a different subject, some people feel that democracy is a Western way of 
doing things that would not work in most Muslim countries – others think that democracy 
is not just for the West and can work well in most Muslim countries. Which comes closer 
to your opinion? 
 
Answer       Score 
Democracy would not work      1 
Other answers       0 
 
 
Q.27 Do you think there is a struggle in (survey country) between moderate Muslims and 
Islamic 
fundamentalists or don’t you think so?  Q.28 Which side do you identify with more in 
this struggle, moderate Muslims or Islamic 
fundamentalists? 
 
Answer       Score 
Fundamentalists      1 
Other answers       0 
 
 
Q.24 How concerned, if at all, are you about the future of Muslims in this country – very 
concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned, or not at all concerned? 
 
Answer       Score 
Very concerned      2 
Somewhat concerned      1 
Other answers       0 
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Q.38 On a different subject, do you believe that groups of Arabs carried out the attacks 
against the United States (the World Trade Center and the Pentagon) on September 11 
(2001) or don’t you believe this? 
 
Answer       Score 
Do not believe Arabs involved    1 
Other answers       0 
 
 
Q.29 Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian 
targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, 
no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel 
that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely 
justified, or never justified? 
 
Answer       Score 
Often justified       3 
Sometimes justified      2 
Rarely but still justified     1 








USER AGREEMENT AND DISCLAIMER FOR THE  




This is a legal agreement between you, the end-user ("User") and Pew Research  
Center (the "Center").  By downloading the survey data made available on this 
web site ("Data") you are agreeing to be bound by the terms and conditions of 
this agreement.  If you do not agree to be bound by these terms, do not download 
or use the Data. 
 
The Center hereby grants to the User a non-exclusive, revocable, limited, non-
transferable license to use the Data solely for (1) research, scholarly or academic 
purposes, (2) the internal use of your business, or (3) your own personal non-
commercial use.  You may not reproduce, sell, rent, lease, loan, distribute or 
sublicense or otherwise transfer any Data, in whole or in part, to any other party, 
or use the Data to create any derived product for resale, lease or license.  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, you may incorporate limited portions of the Data 
in scholarly, research or academic publications or for the purposes of news 
reporting, provided you acknowledge the source of the Data (with express 
references to the Center, as well as the complete title of the report) and include 
the following legend: 
 
THE DATA IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, 
EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ARISING BY LAW OR OTHERWISE, 
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO WARRANTIES OF COMPLETENESS,  
NON-INFRINGEMENT, ACCURACY, MERCHANTABILITY, OR FITNESS FOR 
A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE USER ASSUMES ALL RISK ASSOCIATED 
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WITH USE OF THE DATA AND AGREES THAT IN NO EVENT SHALL THE 
CENTER BE LIABLE TO YOU OR ANY THIRD PARTY FOR ANY INDIRECT, 
SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, PUNITIVE OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES 
INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, DAMAGES FOR THE INABILITY TO 
USE EQUIPMENT OR ACCESS DATA, LOSS OF BUSINESS, LOSS OF 
REVENUE OR PROFITS, BUSINESS INTERRUPTIONS, LOSS OF 
INFORMATION OR DATA, OR OTHER FINANCIAL LOSS, ARISING OUT OF 
THE USE OF, OR INABILITY TO USE, THE DATA BASED ON ANY THEORY 
OF LIABILITY INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, BREACH OF 
CONTRACT, BREACH OF WARRANTY, TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE), 
OR OTHERWISE, EVEN IF USER HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY 
OF SUCH DAMAGES. 
 
The Center has taken measures to ensure that the Data is devoid of information 
that could be used to identify individuals (e.g., names, telephone numbers, email 
addresses, social security numbers) who participated in or who were the subject 
of any research surveys or studies used to collect the Data ("Personally 
Identifying Information").  However, in the event that you discover any such 
Personally Identifying Information in the Data, you shall immediately notify the 
Center and refrain from using any such Personally Identifying Information. 
 
This license will terminate (1) automatically without notice from the Center if you 
fail to comply with the provisions of this agreement, or (2) upon written notice (by 
75 
 
e-mail, U.S. or otherwise) from the Center.  Upon termination of this agreement, 
you agree to destroy all copies of any Data, in whole or in part and in any and all 
media, in your custody and control. 
 
This agreement shall be governed by, construed and interpreted in accordance 
with the laws of the District of Columbia. You further agree to submit to the 
jurisdiction and venue of the courts of the District of Columbia for any dispute 
relating to this Agreement. The Pew Global Attitudes Project bears no 
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